The idea that the governance mechanisms affect firms' performance is well acknowledged in management literature. The settings prevailing in governance studies explain board's roles at the light of the agency theory framework. However, a complementary perspective is focused on the acquisition of critical resources closely related to activation of external relations with the most influential actors of firm's environment. One such kind of external relationship is called interlocking directorates and occur when an individual simultaneously sits on the board of two companies.
Introduction
The idea that governance mechanisms affect firms' performance is well acknowledged in management literature. Board of director (BoD) is one of the most important mechanisms of governance (Donaldson and Davis, 1991; Williamson, 1985; Mintzberg, 1983) .
According to Fama (1980) , BoD "is viewed as a market induced institution, the ultimate internal monitor of the set of contracts called a firm, whose most important role is to scrutinize the highest decision makers within the firm".
The settings prevailing in governance studies explain BoD's roles at the light of the agency and managerial theories framework (Fama and Jensen 1983; Jensen and Meckling 1976; Berle and Means, 1932) . However, a complementary perspective is focused on the contingency concept and on the acquisition of critical resources closely related to activation of external relations with the most influential actors of firm's environment. Grandori (1997) argues that governance mechanisms are bundled in specific ways to handle specific transactions and activities. Lawrence and Lorsch (1967) have stressed the notion of fit, typically among organizational and governance structures and environmental conditions. One such kind of external relationship is called interlocking directorates and occur when an individual simultaneously sits on the BoD of two companies (Mizruchi, 1996) .
Interlocking directorates have important implications for the structure and effective functioning of BoD, which in turn have an important role to play in corporate governance and company performance (Hermalin and Weisbach, 2003) . In this sense, Yeo, Pochet and Alcouffe (2003) find a positive relationship between the number of CEOs reciprocal interlocks and their firms' performance measured by ROA.
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According to network literature (Uzzi, 1997; Burt, 1992; Coleman, 1988; Granovetter, 1973) and strategic management literature (Gnyawali, He and Madhavan, 2006; Echols and Tsai, 2005; Zaheer and Bell, 2005; Gnyawali and Madhavan, 2001; Gulati, Nohria and Zaheer, 2000; Gulati, 1999) , not only the number of interlock but also the structure of these relationships could affect firms' competitive behavior and performance.
Following Mac Canna, Brennan and O'Higgins (1998) , primary to the paper is the idea that the network of interlocking directorates among banks and other firms is structured and not the result of random processes.
More in detail, the objective of this paper is to look at the incidence of interlocking directorates in Italian firms and to examine the effects of the structure of such interlocks on performance. By analyzing interlocking directorates among listed banks and non financial firms in Italy, using the methods and theory of social network analysis (SNA), this study aims to verify that banks are the most influential actors in the network and that centrality in the network enhances their financial performance.
To my knowledge, this would be the first systematic study of the relationships among structure of interlocking directorates and performance in Italy.
The study proceeds as follows.
In the first section I develop theory and hypotheses. Following I outline my study setting and methodology, and present results. Finally, I present implications, limits and conclusions.
Theory and hypotheses
The belief that the improvement of governance systems can contribute to increase corporate performance is an important condition for the study of BoDs. More and more importance is 4 being given in literature to the study of the characteristics of BoDs and to the consequences of such characteristics in terms of overall performance.
Several studies argue that the effectiveness of corporate governance depends to a large extent on structures and on decisional mechanisms of BoDs (Carretta, Regalli and Schwizer, 2006; Forbes and Milliken, 1999; Jensen, 1993; Provan, 1980; Mace, 1971) .
Structure and functioning of BoD are important topics, which have been vested, over the years, with increasingly broad and complex tasks, ranging from setting strategic development guidelines to guiding and supervising the performance of management. An unreliable BoD determines investor distrust and, consequently, the increased cost of capital.
BoD, therefore, is an institution that can help to limit management-related agency problems, which primarily concern conflicts of interest between the ownership and the management of a business, and represents a key governance mechanism for making sure that the objectives of the shareholders and those of the management are kept in line (Freeman, 1984; Fama and Jensen, 1983; Jensen and Meckling, 1976) .
Over the years, however, a complementary perspective sees BoD in a systemic way, within a network of relations with the most influential actors of firm's environment (Grandori and Carpani, 2004; Child and Rodriguez, 2003; Mintz and Schwartz, 1985; Pfeffer and Salancik, 1978; Levine, 1972) . In this perspective, interlocking directorates can assume different meanings depending on the interpretive model (Bianco and Pagnoni, 1997 From a managerial point of view, the autonomy between ownership and management implies that can not be attributed a particular mean to interlocking directorates since structural links between BoDs can in any way influence the decisions of management (Mace, 1971 ).
According to the class cohesion model, however, interlocking directorates represent an instrument for the strengthening of class relationships aimed to the formation of a "corporate elite" (Scott, 2003 ).
The control model sees the interlocking directorates as the result of a particular structure of the economic system at the heart of which lies an actor which exercises the control of the other actors, typically a bank. Furthermore, the model of financial capital recognizes the greater power of banks due to the greater control of financial capital flows within the belonging network (Mintz and Schwartz, 1985; Levine, 1972) .
Finally, the resource-dependency model sees interlocking directorates aimed to the achievement of mutual interests for firms (Pennings, 1980) , allowing the reinforcement of social capital and the access to knowledge circuits.
If it is true that the need to activate relations grows when resource-dependency increases, then networking activity is a necessary relational strategy.
According to Pfeffer (1972) interlocking directorates have at least the following benefits / implications: i) ties allow to establish relationships and alliances with other firms, ii) ties allow to acquire information on markets and competitors, iii) ties allow to have a privileged access to resources, iv) ties allow to face possible threats, iv) ties allow to influence the activities and the strategies of other firms.
In particular, from banks' perspective, if the enforcement of contracts is poor and obtaining information about borrowers is costly lending interlocking directorates are a way for banks to 6 reduce asymmetries of information and monitoring costs. From firms' perspective, interlocking directorates could be useful in case of credit rationing and of limited substitutes for it.
Theoretically, according to financial capital, control and resource-dependency perspectives, banks should have the higher power of influence than the other firms. Effectively, Allen (1974) observes that banks have more interlocking directorates compared with other firms.
Moreover, Kotz (1978) states that banks, as shareholders and creditors, can exercise a significant influence in the decisions of the bodies of government of other firms. Furthermore, since resource-dependency becomes greater during the periods of crisis, it is in these moments that banks may play a central role in the decision-making of firms.
However, Davis and Mizruchi (1999) , through an analysis of comprehensive data on the Could the greater centrality positively affect performance? If networks provide channels for the exchange of information and resources then central firms can use these channels to reach key information and resources that enhance, from one side, the knowledge about strategies and resources of competing firms, even in the absence of any asset flows (Harrigan, 1986) and, from the other side, power (Gnyawali and Madhavan, 2001; Wasserman and Faust, 1994; Burt, 1980) . Actors occupying central positions in a network are viewed as potentially powerful because of their greater access to and possible control over relevant resources and several studies have shown that differential access to network resources leads to different performance levels. A substantial body of literature has analyzed both the contingencies under which one network structure is more beneficial relative to the other (Burt, 2007; Soda, Usai and Zaheer, 2004; Ahuja, 2000; Rowley, Behrens and Krackhardt, 2000; Podolny 1993 ) and the relations between firms' network position (deriving from ties with other firms) and performance (Almeida, Dokko and Rosenkopf, 2003; Lee, Lee and Pennings, 2001; Powell, Koput, SmithDoerr and Owen-Smith, 1999; Stuart, 2000) .
In synthesis, relationships in a network are potential sources of firm internal resources (Langlois, 1992; Nohria, 1992) , whose effectiveness is dependent by network structure (Burt, 1992) and by internal capabilities (McEvily and Zaheer, 1999) . Following, quality and relevance of information and resources deriving from favourable networks positions can improve a firm's performance (Cross and Cummings, 2004) .
In fact, an important feature of network ties is that they operate as "pipelines" through which information' and resources' flows are exchanged among firms (Owen-Smith and Powell, 2004) . The strategic contingencies and resource dependency frameworks (Hickson, Butler, Cray, Mallory and Wilson, 1971; Salancik and Pfeffer, 1977) posit that power derives from the control of relevant resources. This concept of control by one single actor implies that others in the network have few alternative sources for acquiring the resource, such that the actor controls or mediates others' access to the resource.
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Centrality in the network is the extent to which an actor controls or is deeply involved in these network flows (Gnyawali and Madhavan, 2001; Wasserman and Faust, 1994; Burt, 1980) . If networks provide channels for the exchange of information and resources then central firms can use these channels to reach key information and resources that enhance, from one side, the knowledge about strategies and resources of competing firms, even in the absence of any asset flows (Harrigan, 1986) and, from the other side, power (Gnyawali and Madhavan, 2001; Wasserman and Faust, 1994; Burt, 1980) . Actors occupying central positions in a network are viewed as potentially powerful because of their greater access to and possible control over relevant resources (Boje and Whetten, 1981) .
Central firms enjoy advantages from network position also because their resource superiority reduces competitors' likelihood of response (Chen, 1996) as less central competitors will find it more difficult and costly to give a response because their limited information set. In addition, since central competitors are more prestigious and more powerful, other firms are less likely to want to provoke them.
In this sense, from a greater centrality should derive an increased possibility of controlling all potential flows of resources (e.g., information and capital) and an increased performance.
Thus:
H2: Bank's performance is positively related to centrality.
Data and variables
The sample consists of all firms listed on the Italian Stock Exchange in 2006 with the exception of Expandi market (collectively relationships between 255 firms are analyzed).
To verify the hypothesis H1 I used a sub-sample formed by listed banks and insurance companies. To verify the hypothesis H2 the former sub-sample was restricted to 30 banks 9 (without insurance companies). The analysis of the relationship between BoDs is based on the use of CONSOB's data while the performance of banks was calculated using Bankscope's data referred to year 2006.
The analysis of the performance of banks is based on ROE and ROA measures, commonly used in literature (Goddard, Molyneux and Wilson, 2004; Molyneux, 2003; Demirguc-Kunt and Huizinga, 2000; Berger, 1995) .
In addition, in order to measure banks' power of influence (given by the centrality in the network of interlocking directorates), I used the technique of social network analysis (Wasserman and Faust, 1994; Mitchell, 1969) . Using a social network analysis software, UCINET VI (Borgatti, Everett and Freeman, 2002) , I applied this technique in order to describe the structure of the network, through the following indicators: i) number of connections of each actor (degree) and ii) centrality of each actor in the network (betweenness).
The degree of individual players in the network is important because it reveals the number of connections that are activated for each subject and, consequently, the size of individual relationships.
However, the information on the degree is not in itself sufficient to determine the importance of the actors. To determine the importance of an actor in connecting other players in the network means, in fact, to analyze the degree of intervention, that is the frequency with which each actor is on the minimum path between other players. Betweenness refers to how often an actor in the network is the shortest route to reach the other players, regardless of the direction of the relationship (in or out). Betweenness for a given actor i is calculated to sum up the number of geodesic paths between two distinct actors, j and k that pass through i. Increasing the value given to the centrality measure also increases the likelihood that the plaintiff will be able to influence the interaction between the other players.
Analysis
Checking the hypothesis that banks are the most central players in the network of interlocking directorates among listed companies (H1) is based on the observation and the comparison of the indicators related to degree and betweenness. In particular, the hypothesis H1 is verified if degree and betweenness of banks and insurance companies are greater than degree and betweenness of the other firms.
Checking the hypothesis that the performance of banks is positively influenced by the centrality in the network of reference (H2) is based on the construction of an appropriate model of analysis. In detail, following relations should be verified:
(1) ROE = β 0 + β 1 L _ASSET + β 2 EQUIT_TA + β 3 COSTI CO + β 4 CE TRAL + ε (2) ROA = β 0 + β 1 L _ASSET + β 2 COSTI CO + β 3 CE TRAL + ε
In the models it is identified: with the variable ROE the ratio between net income and equity; with the variable ROA the ratio between net income and total assets; with the variable LN_ASSET the logarithm of total assets, which expresses the size of the bank; with the variable EQUIT_TA the weight of equity on total assets (book value), which is an indicator of the bank's financial leverage (adequacy of capital); with the variable COSTINCO the level of efficiency of the bank; with the variable CENTRAL the degree of centrality (betweenness) of the bank. In response, hypothesis H2 is verified if: 11 -in model 1, coefficient β 4 is positive and statistically significant; -in model 2, the coefficient β 3 is positive and statistically significant.
Results
Following figure shows the graphic representation of the network structure for the 255 firms listed in Italian Stock Exchange (Figure 1) . Degree of banks and insurance companies is also due to the greater BoD size and to the larger presence of BoD members with more than one appointment (Figures 3 and 4) . Moreover, the regression models 1 and 2 seem to confirm (even if only partially, since in the model 1 β 4 is positive but not significant) the hypothesis H2 on the existence of a relationship among centrality and banks' financial performance. 671506 -0,13908 -0,42716 COSTINCO 62,9 19,71408 -0,40752 -0,63431 0,152377 EQUIT_TA 0,109936 0,147926 -0,19476 0,539542 -0,30335 -0,55152 CENTRAL 156,6 195,252 0,151621 0,348257 0,064285 -0,21415 0,269431 The summary information relating to the models 1 and 2 are shown in the following table (Table 2) . In model 2, the coefficient on the variable CENTRAL is positive and significant at the 10% level and this confirms the original hypothesis (H2). As in the case of model 1 also coefficients for the other explanatory variables considered for the model 2 are all significant at the 5% level and the signs are consistent with expectations.
The value R 2 adjusted for this model is 0,529 while the F statistic is equal to 11,863. Finally, the values of the statistic Variance Inflation Factor (VIF) indicate in this case, the absence of multi-collinearity between explanatory variables.
Conclusions
This study gives a contribution to governance literature by investigating the relations of influence in the Italian corporate network and their effects on performance and results shows favourable evidences for banks. In further detail I suggest a systemic vision of governance that sees firms not as isolated individuals but as actors belonging to a network of relationships that contribute to define governance mechanisms.
By considering the social processes that underlie the formation of interlocking directorates among banks and other firms I examined performance's consequences for banks in terms of opportunities that they can extract from their network-building activities. Results provide evidence that banks benefit from their positions within networks.
Based on the assumption that the power depends not only by the number of connections activated but also by the quality, these results show how the centrality in the network gives a positive and significant contribution to the performance in financial industry.
Moreover, according to financial capital, control and resource-dependency perspectives, the relationships between banks and other firms are characterized mainly by the firms' dependence on banks since they are greater control of financial capital.
In greater detail, two evidences can be observed: i) banks are actually the players which hold the greater power of influence in the network of interlocking directorates formed with other firms; ii) the contribution given by the quality of network ties on the overall performance of banks is positive and significant.
However, this study has several limitations.
First, I concentrate only on one type of interorganizational relations but the analysis of the Italian corporate network should be enriched by adding data about ownership ties and other relations (supplier relations, customer relations, etc.) among banks and firms.
Second, rather than taking a snapshot of the Italian corporate network in 2006, it would be preferable to study its evolution a larger period.
Finally, although the primary focus of my analysis was effects of network position on banking performance, other important questions could be raised. In particular, an interesting area for future research is the way through which changes that occur in competitive environment determine changes of banks' position in corporate network.
